In response to mostly Haslanger's first article but also the overall idea of both; I find a dilemma she attempts to work around but never meaningfully understands or solves. On pg. 41 of the 1st essay she says "...someone marked for subordination by reference to (assumed) male anatomy does not qualify as a woman, but also, in the particular context, is not socially positioned as a man." So oppression can give you a gender or a race, and also take it away? She seems to see blacks and women as uncontestedly clearcut terms (by definition), but for black men who are visibly oppressed (for being black) and at the same time advantaged (for being male), all she can say about them is that they're not men but not women; so considering a myriad of characteristics of any given individual, are they x% male and x% female depending on how advantaged:oppressed they are?
My point is this: rather than--the more ambiguous their oppressed/advantaged ratio, the less of an identity they have, why don't we conceive of oppression as versus traits or characteristics instead of people. I think it more plausible to say and the explain: not that people are oppressed and thus their identities are solely a product of their oppression, but rather their traits are oppressed and as bearers of those characteristics they suffer oppression.
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