- We are (at least in the first place) neutral in terms of justifications or reasons for laws, not in terms of the outcomes of these laws.
- We are neutral about identities, rather than say citizens or even more simply beliefs (the latter would insist that we have to find a way of being neutral about any belief that anyone in a given polity has, you might also construe this in Rawlsian fashion as 'neutralism about reasonable beliefs').
Does the recognition of identity in (a) sit well with Appiah's overall eliminiativism about racial thinking? If you think it does fit well, explain how so. If you think it does not fit well, describe where and why you see a tension here.
5 comments:
There is an obvious tension in all eliminativists in how to get rid of the given category without leaving the people in that category to the the dangers of discrimination. Appiah's goal of neutrality does seem to come into conflict with the instatement of anti-discrimination laws, as they clearly take identities into account in their justification.
Does this lead to a strict denial of their value by Appiah? Like most of the topics in this book, Appiah is looking for a balance. Like in his attempts to consolidate autonomy and determinsim, he is looking for a balance between extremes. And as Colin mentioned in class, the later Appiah has relaxed his eliminativism considerably.
He advocates, in ch. 5, a "piecemeal" approach to liberal politics, in general,(165) and anti-discrimination laws, in particular.(198) I read this as advocating enforcing anti-discrimination laws on a case by case basis, being careful not to impose too much on autonomy. Although the criteria of response does seem purposely vague.
A huge tension arises with these conditions of anti-discrimination laws. Appiah believes that the government should remain neutral when creating laws; but not the laws effects. If the government is labeling categories (and conditions behind them) while they are making laws, there is an obvious tension with Appiah. Appiah would probably be okay If the government were to make a law like all citizens cannot criticize or harm other citizens because of their categories. Going into detail and actually labeling them is what is problematic.
Also, this type of anti-discrimination laws implies that the government is acting in a 'perfectionist' manner in trying to change 'ethical selves' of the individuals. It may sound crude, but in a liberal society, racist thinking should be permitted under the condition it is done in the private sphere and does not harm/hinder anyone else.
Appiah holds a tension between eliminativism and reformism where he seems to be backsliding more into reformism. He begins the book strongly in his discussion of autonomy, liberalism, and individuality. But as he begins to move from theory into practice things start to become a little weaker. For Appiah eliminativism seems like the clear way to approach race thinking but it seems that he just cannot accept that and looks to reformist politics as a way of skirting injustice. So yes, his discussion of affirmative action and the recognition of contentious identities does fit well within his eliminativism because it really isn't a very strong eliminativism at all. He relies too much on the state to impose his vision of eliminativism. I wonder though, why he expects the state to feel the need for eliminativism when it is the state that is the most invested in social identities such as race, gender, sexuality, etc in the first place. The concept of race is embedded in all of these other categories and in the way that our government works as a whole today. To even think that the elimination of race is possible without a radical perspective on race and the investments of the proponents of capital (there is a lot of money to be made in marketing race and other social categories) in these concepts is absurd. There is no way that the state will so easily relinquish its grasp on the ability to control and shape the way we think of ourselves and each other. Affirmative action, even on the individualistisc basis that Appiah calls for, is only a band-aid solution to a greater problem that brews beneath. If the root of the problem is not addressed, we may be free of racism in a number of decades but something else will just take its place.
Whether or not identity recognition conflicts with Appiah's alleged eliminativist approach to racial thinking is seen here through antidiscrimination laws.
Antidiscrimination laws necessitate identity recognition despite the fact that many would like to say that antidiscrimination laws are blind (Post), and the key here I think is how you would characterize antidiscrimination laws, and how you would characterize Appiah's approach to racial thinking.
Antidiscrimination laws are arguable reformist, not eliminativist. Whereas Appiah is arguable the opposite. While Anti-Disc. laws may thus seem incompatible with Appiah's own views, I would point out that Appiah's ideas can be seen as ideals, and Anti-Disc. laws as practices. Anti-Disc. laws accomplish (through a reformist strategy i.e. soul-making, albeit indirect in this case) what could eventually be the end of racism.
It seems necessary to me that you must engage in reformist practices if you are an eliminativist, no matter what. So no, the recognition of identity is not only compatible with Appiah's eliminativist goals, but absolutely necessary.
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