Sundstrom challenges two features of Appiah's thinking about race: A) Appiah's metaphysical skepticism then constructionism (his position appears to be shifting here) according to which racial categories are at worst illusory (skepticism) and at best mere effects of contingent social processes (constructionism); B) Appiah's moral eliminativism according to which we should refrain from racial thinking at least from the appropriate moral standpoint of political justification.
Focusing primarily on (A), Sundstrom invokes a "metaphysical pluralism" which he develops in conversation with Hacking and Root. According to this view, there is no one single correct theory of reality (such as would be held by the "metaphysical monist"), but rather multiple correct theories for multiple practices. Therefore, the fact that "race" has no viable metaphysical standing in the view of biology or physics does not mean that there is no domain of practice or science in which "race" is real on a viable metaphysics.
Sundstrom finds the thought that "race" is constructed needlessly modest in conceding the term "real" to the biologist and physicist only. Sundstrom suggests that races can be real, too, even if their reality is not of the same kind as quarks and genes.
Since Sundstrom does not focus much attention on (B), it will be helpful to consider the implications of his revision of (A) for (B). Given that Sundstrom is a kind of "racial realist" (on the basis of a metaphysical pluralism), what viable normative positions might he take? Does his "realism" push against the eliminativism of Appiah, Zack, and Webster? What about realism and reformism? Is there anything in Sundstrom's brand of realism that might help us avoid a conservative moral position toward race according to which everything is fine as we have it now.
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Through adopting a metaphysical pluralist position, Sundstrom explains how one might not restrict real kinds to those said to be of a mind-independent reality. He acknowledges racial categories to be mind-dependent and socially constructed, and as a result of metaphysical pluralism, allows racial categories within the domain of 'reality.' However, although Sundstrom is a racial realist who rejects Appiahan eliminativism, this does not necessarily lead to a conservatist position. Firstly, we might see that while one understands something to be 'real,' it does not follow necessarily that one hold that we ought to keep things the way they are. Also, in light of his acknowledgment of the contingent, socially constructed nature of the categories, Sundstrom might just as well adopt a reformist position. That is, if the categories are thought to be real, yet mind-dependent, a realist acknowledgment of the categories could facilitate reformation of the categories. In this case Sundstrom might maintain his realist position while avoiding the conservativist account.
According to Sundstrom, Appiah and the other elimitivists all use a false premise: "race" is not real, and that is what he specifically attacks. He says this wrongly assumes monist metaphysics and and if a pluralist metaphysics is adopted, then the idea of what is real, varies greatly. Sundstrom agrees that race is not real on an atomic or genetic level, but we should not limit our understanding of reality to those narrow perspectives. In other words, he broadens the concept of reality is such a way to allow "race" in.
Sunstrom goes on to specifically critique Appiah for claiming that race is a nominal kind and yet still has no meaning. I found this to be a very strong objection, admittedly because I tend to agree with Appiah here. On the one hand, Appiah says that our sociiohistorical groups have been pushed into nominal racial categories. They DO have social impact and are dynamically nominal (we see the influence of Hacking here). On the other hand he still seems to claim that racial categories have no sense or reference. To this end, he explores both the ideational theory of meaning as well as the referential theory of meaning. He comes out of this analysis with the idea that individuals share "criterial beliefs" about what race is, and as such they have some kind of nominal existence and yet the criteria is so loose that they have no real reference, except for under special conditions (like when a group all shares the same criterial beliefs). I do not think that Sundstrom defeated Appiah's claim that "race" is not real, because he didn't say enough about pluralism in this context. I would be concerned that Sundstom's pluralistic realism would find a defeater sooner or later because the idea of "real" is too broad.
This did not even tackle the problem of what to do with "race" given it's ontological status (Jonas went over this in his entry). I think Webster might be too strong of an elimitiviist in saying that all talk to "race" in nonsensical and pointless. Again, Appiah does not hold this position (there is a social point).
If anyone has taken a class with Abe Stone, you'll likely recall that he stresses the distinction between theoretical and practical. For me, this is very relevant in discussing race. Theoretically, race is not real (as I'm sure most everyone agrees by now). For the most part, it is also nonsensical because nobody even agrees on what a race actually is. However, practically there is some criterial beliefs that are shared in such a way that they are useful (I argued for the 7-11 clerk using "race" in a prior blog). IMO, these always have to do with physical traits.
Despite Sundstrom's belief in racial realism, I doubt he holds the conservative moral position that our concept of race is fine the way it is. He clearly states that we need to believe that race is real in order to deal with the social problems that accompany it. Sundstrom's problem with people who are skeptical of race, like Appiah, is that their beliefs leave no room for retributive justice or a discussion of group rights. He says that in order to "to end racism and 'racial' disparities in income, health, education, and so on, we need to be able to coherently talk about 'race'." Furthermore, "we need to be able to point to it, discover what it is and the role it plays in our lives." Sundstrom would agree with Hacking that natural kinds can be analyzed by the utility that they have for us and our understanding of the world we live in and the people we live with. There are better and worse ways of classifying natural kinds and the utility of our classifications varies depending on time, place and interests. Sundstrom could argue that our current racial classifications are ontologically real but they do not have the most utility for us and should be reformed to fit the values of our modern times.
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